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ABSTRACT 
Recently, Bluetooth technology is widely used by organizations and individuals to provide wireless personal 
area network (WPAN). This is because the radio frequency (RF) waves can easily penetrate obstacles and can 
propagate without direct line-of-sight (LoS). These two characteristics have led to replace wired communication 
by wireless systems. However, there are serious security challenges associated with wireless communication 
systems because they are easier to eavesdrop, disrupt and jam than the wired systems. Bluetooth technology 
started with a form of pairing called legacy pairing prior to any communication. However, due to the serious 
security  issues  found  in  the  legacy  pairing,  a  secure  and  simple  pairing  called  SPP  was  announced  with 
Bluetooth 2.1 and later since 2007. SPP has solved the main security issue which is the weaknesses of the PIN 
code in the legacy pairing, however it has been found with some vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping and man-
in-the-middle  (MITM)  attacks.  Since  the  discovery  of  these  vulnerabilities,  some  enhancements  have  been 
proposed  to  the  Bluetooth  Specification  Interest  Group  (SIG)  which  is  the  regulatory  body  of  Bluetooth 
technology;  nevertheless,  some  proposed  enhancements  are  ineffective  or  are  not  yet  implemented  by 
Manufacturers. Therefore, an improvement of the security authentication  in Bluetooth connection is  highly 
required to overcome the existing drawbacks. This proposed protocol uses Hash-based Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) algorithm with Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256). The implementation of this proposal is based 
on the Arduino Integrated Development Environment (IDE) as software and a Bluetooth (BT) Shield connected 
to an Arduino Uno R3 boards as hardware. The result was verified on a Graphical User Interface (GUI) built in 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 with C sharp as default environment. It has shown that the proposed scheme 
works perfectly with the used hardware and software. In addition, the protocol thwarts the passive and active 
eavesdropping  attacks  which  exist  during  SSP.  These  attacks  are  defeated  by  avoiding  the  exchange  of 
passwords and public keys in plain text between the Master and the Slave. Therefore, this protocol is expected 
to be implemented by the SIG to enhance the security in Bluetooth connection.  
Keywords- Authentication, Bluetooth Security, HMAC Algorithm, Legacy Pairing, Secure and Simple Pairing.
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A wireless personal area network (WPAN) “Fig. 
1,”  is  a  short-distance  wireless  network  specially 
designed to support portable and mobile computing 
devices  such  as  personal  computer  (PC),  personal 
digital assistants (PDA), cell phones, printers, pagers, 
storage devices,  and a variety of consumer electronic 
equipments  [1].  Bluetooth  technology  which  was 
developed  to  replace  the  existing  wire  line 
connections  is  used  in  WPAN  with  short-range 
interconnectivity. Moreover, Bluetooth radio operates 
in the license-free and globally available Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band at 2.4 GHz [2] 
using Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) 
and are capable of transmitting  voice and data [3]. 
Bluetooth  provides  enough  bandwidth  that  enables 
data exchange between several mobile devices at a 
rate up to 1 Mbps [1] for version 2.0 (and earlier) and 
up to 3 Mbps for version 2.1 (and later) [4][5].  
 
Bluetooth  standard  is  designed  for  downward 
compatibility  which  means  that  the  latest  versions 
can support all features available in old versions. In 
Bluetooth connection, a piconet is a small network 
created on an ad hoc basis that includes one master 
device and up to seven slaves while a scatternet is 
chain of piconets that allows one or more Bluetooth 
devices to be a slave in one piconet and act as the 
master for another piconet, simultaneously [4]. 
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Fig. 1.  Introduction to Bluetooth connection 
     
In  order  for  two  Bluetooth  devices  to 
communicate within a piconet, they need to perform 
a  mutual  authentication.  During  the  mutual 
authentication,  pairing  is  performed  in  order  to 
establish the connection. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows: 
section II discusses the existing pairing methods and 
the  corresponding  limitations.  Section  III  provides 
related  works  on  the  actual  pairing  methods.  The 
proposed  authentication  scheme  is  described  in 
section IV followed by an implementation result in 
section  V.  Section  VI  gives  the  discussion  and  a 
conclusion is shown in section VII. 
  
II.  EXISTING PAIRING METHODS AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS 
2.1 Legacy Pairing  
The  legacy  pairing  is  vulnerable  to  different 
security issues such as weak PIN code, passive and 
active  eavesdropping.  This  method  of  pairing 
requires  each  device  to  enter  a  Personal  Identity 
Number  (PIN)  code  in  order  to  perform  pairing. 
Pairing is  successful only if  both devices enter the 
same code. In [6], it is stated that many Bluetooth 
devices today use a 4-digits PIN or a fixed PIN of 
commonly  known  values  which  significantly  limit 
the  security  of  the  link  key.  Therefore,  during  the 
pairing procedure there is a very high probability for 
an attacker to get the used PIN as in [7] [8] [9].  
 
2.2  Secure and Simple Pairing (SSP) 
In  SSP  the  pairing  process  is  enhanced  and 
became simple and more secure due to the non-use of 
a fixed PIN code. However, several attacks have been 
reported recently on its four pairing methods:  
 
Attacks on the Just Work Model: A Bluetooth non-
input non-out man-in-the middle attack (BT-NINO-
MITM) in the just work model was identified in [12] 
and implemented in [11]. In [13], it is published a 
novel Bluetooth MITM attack called BT-SPP-Printer-
MITM attack against the just  work  model. Besides 
that,  an  attack  called  Bluetooth-Secure  and  Simple 
Pairing-  Headset/Hands-Free-Man  in  the  middle 
attack  (BT-SSP-HS/HF-MITM)  was  proposed  in 
[14]. To perform the attack, the authors exploited the 
fact that most Headset/Hands-Free Bluetooth devices 
can  be  forced  to  choose  the  less  secure  just  work 
model[12][13]. 
 
Attacks  on  the  Passkey  Entry  Model:  The 
possibility  of  successful  eavesdropping  and  MITM 
attack  on  the  passkey  entry  model  has  been 
mentioned  in  [10]  and  the  implementation  in  the 
GNU radio software framework using the universal 
software radio peripheral (USRP) as hardware can be 
found in [5].  
 
Attacks on the Out of Band Model: In [14], it is 
published  a  Bluetooth-Secure  and  Simple  Pairing- 
Out  of  Band-Man  in  the  middle  attack  (BT-SSP-
OOB-MITM) and it is shown that the attack can be 
performed  if  the  attacker  succeeds  to  have  visual 
contact  to  the  legitimate  user’s  device.  The  OOB 
model  was  suggested  to  be  used  as  a  mandatory 
model as in [12] [15]; nevertheless, in [11] it is also 
mentioned that this proposal cannot work.  
 
Case  of  the  Numerical  Comparison  Model: This 
model is not directly attacked; however attackers can 
force legitimate users to select a less secure model 
instead of this secure model. For this reason, in [15] 
it is mentioned that the numerical comparison model 
is also found to be not secure. 
 
III.  RELATED WORKS 
3.1  Legacy Pairing 
In  [16],  it  was  suggested  an  enhancement  of 
Bluetooth authentication using the concatenation of a 
master’s Clock and a Low Address Part (LAP) to be 
xored  with  the  least  42  bits  of  the  Authentication 
Random Number (AU_RAND) before being fed into 
the E1 algorithm, where the signed response (SRES) 
is  computed.  However,  this  improvement  has  its 
drawbacks since it relies on a symmetric key which is 
not securely shared. 
Moreover, in [17] it was designed an improved 
authentication algorithm using the concatenation of a 
clock and a part of address values (PAV) to compute 
the authentication random number: AU_RAND’ = f 
(AU_RAND,  Clock,  PAV).  However,  AU_RAND 
which  is  a  public  parameter  does  not  need  to  be 
changed because this does not prevent to guess the 
PIN code. Therefore, this enhancement is ineffective. 
Reference [18] explored the weakness of the PIN 
and proposed to add a parameter called authentication 
ID (au_id) which is 128 bits in the generation of the 
initialization  key.  This  au_id  is  shared  by  using 
Diffie-Hellman  key  exchange  and  makes  the  PIN 
more  robust:  PIN’=PIN  U  au_id.  However,  this 
current approach remains weak due to the use of the Diallo Alhassane Saliou et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications   www.ijera.com 
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unit  key  and  its  non-implementation  to  assess  its 
performance.  The  Diffie-Hellman  key  exchange 
algorithm used is also prone to the MITM attack. 
 
3.2  Secure and Simple Pairing 
Reference  [19]  developed  an  improved 
authentication  algorithm  by  using  SSP  which 
employs Elliptive Curve Cryptography (ECC) that is 
an  analog  of  Diffie-Hellman  Key  Exchange. 
However, one of the weakness of the ECC is that if 
all  ECC  users  agree  on  a  common  set  of  Elliptive 
Curve  (EC)  parameters,  to  negotiate  these 
parameters,  the  additional  information  needed  to 
specify  the  exact  EC  might  make  the  effective  EC 
key size to become very large. Another  drawback of 
the ECC is that it increases the size of the encrypted 
message  more  than  the  Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 
(RSA)  encryption.  It  is  also  mathematically  subtle 
and more difficult to implement than the RSA.  
In [13] it is proposed to add a message saying 
“The second message has no display and keyboard! 
Is this true?” in the just work model to solve the BT-
NINO-MITM  attack.  After  displaying  the  message, 
the user may choose “Proceed” or “Stop”. However, 
it is shown that this proposal does not solve the attack 
as in [11]. 
In  the  view  of  the  above,  the  authentication 
procedure  in  Bluetooth  connection  needs  to  be 
improved. 
 
IV.  PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION METHOD 
The  proposed  model  employs  a  dual 
authentication which is an authentication concept that 
requires  two  verifications  prior  to  establishing  any 
communication.  
 
4.1  Description  
First of all, a master device is nominated and all 
Bluetooth devices in a piconet are registered into the 
database  of  the  master  device  by  assigning  a 
password and a public key to each device such that 
the password and the public key match the identity 
(ID) of the device as in “Table I.”. This process of 
registration and updating the database is executed by 
the administrator of the WPAN. “Table II.” describes 
all involved security entities in the proposed model. 
 
TABLE I.  DATABASE OF THE MASTER DEVICE 
No  Identities  Passwords  Public Keys 
1  IDA  PwdA  KUA 
2  IDB  PwdB  KUB 
3  IDC  PwdC  KUC 
4  IDD  PwdD  KUD 
5  IDE  PwdE  KUE 
6  IDF  PwdF  KUF 
7  IDG  PwdG  KUG 
 
TABLE II.   DEFINITION OF INVOLVED 
PARAMETERS AND SYMBOLS 
No  Parameters  Description  Size  Status 
1  ID = 
BD_ADDR 
Identity = 
Bluetooth 
device address 
48 
bits 
public 
2  PwdA  Password of 
slave A 
128 
bits  
private 
3  Kc  Secret key 
derived from 
PwdA 
128 
bits 
private 
4  IV  Initial Value  128 
bits 
private 
5  KUA  or 
KUa 
Slave public 
key 
128 
bits 
public  
6  KRA or KRa  Slave private 
key 
128 
bits 
private 
7  Ks  Session Key  
for AES 
128 
bits 
private 
8  K
+  HMAC secret 
key  
256 
bits 
private 
9  M  HMAC 
Authentication 
message 
512 
bits 
private 
10  HMAC  Authentication 
Algorithm 
HMAC 
   
11  CA & Cm  Slave and 
master 
commitments 
values 
256 
bits 
public 
12  ||,  E,  D  Concatenation, 
encryption, 
and decryption 
Symbols 
   
 
Secondly, we list all initial parameters possessed 
by both devices: 
Slave A: (IDA, PwdA, KUA, KRA,).  
Master: (IDA… IDG, PwdA… PwdG, KUA…KUG). 
 
4.2 Different Phases of the Proposed 
Authentication Scheme 
1) First Authentication Stage (Phase 1): This first 
phase consists of three messages between the master 
and  the  slave.  It  will  result  to  a  first  verification 
called first authentication stage or handshaking. 
Message 1: A slave which would like to establish a 
secure communication with the master device sends 
its ID to the master. 
Message 2: The master receives the ID and checks its 
database to see whether the received ID exists in the 
data base or not. If it exists, the master will derive a 
secret key (Kc) from the corresponding password of 
the current ID. However, if the ID is not registered 
previously in the database, it means that none of the 
seven  devices  of  the  piconet  has  sent  its  ID. 
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Assuming  that  the  ID  exists  in  the  database,  the 
master  generates  randomly  a  session  key  (Ks)  and 
derive a secret key (Kc) from the stored password. 
The derivation of (Kc) is executed as follows: 
  If the password length is less than 16 bytes, 
zero  padding  is  applied  to  the  left  most 
significant bits in order to get a key size of 16 
bytes.  
  If the password length is exactly 16 bytes, it is 
used  directly  as  a  key  without  any 
modification. 
  If the password length is greater than 16 bytes, 
Fanfold operation is applied to get 16 bytes. 
A double encryption of the MAC address of the 
slave  (IDA)  will  be  executed  using  the  AES 
encryption with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode 
which is a recommended  mode due to its  security. 
The first encryption is done by using the session key 
(Ks) and the second encryption is done by using the 
derived secret key (Kc). The master will send to the 
slave  the  double  encryption  (Cipher  2)  with  the 
concatenation  of  the  encryption  of  the  initial  value 
(IV) (1). 
EKc [EKs (IDA)] || EKUa (IV) = EKc [Cipher 1] || EKUa 
(IV) = Cipher 2 || EKUa (IV)                                  (1) 
     The purpose of the double encryption is to identify 
the slave by asking the user to recover cipher 1 as 
well as to avoid the following attack: assuming that 
an  attacker  has  eavesdropped  on  the  wireless 
connection and captured the cipher sent in Message 
2,  he  cannot  recover  neither  cipher  1  nor  the  IV 
because only the legitimate user knows the password 
from  which  Kc  is  derived  and  the  private  key  to 
decrypt  the  encrypted  IV.  Upon  receiving  cipher  2 
with the concatenation of the encrypted (IV), the user 
recovers the IV by using his private key as in (2).  
DKRa (IV) = IV                                                        (2) 
     After  that,  the  system  prompts  him  to  enter  his 
password and derive the same secret key Kc in order 
to decrypt cipher 2 as in (3).  
DKc (Cipher 2) = DKc {EKc [EKs (IDA)]} = Cipher 1 (3) 
If  cipher  1  is  successfully  recovered,  it  means 
that  the  correct  password  is  supplied.  Failure  to 
provide the correct password will result to abort the 
connection. 
Message 3: The user returns to the master cipher 1 
together with his device ID as in (4). Here the master 
will  decrypt  cipher  1  by  using  (Ks)  and  get  the 
encrypted ID. After that, the master will compare the 
original  ID  and  the  sent  ID  in  Message  3.  If  they 
match, it means that Message 2 was not altered and 
Message 3 is sent by the exact slave. Otherwise, the 
connection will be aborted. This is the end of the first 
authentication stage. 
IDA || Cipher 1 = IDA || EKs (IDA)                         (4) 
 
2) Exchange of Secret Key (Phase 2): This phase 
consists of one message. 
Message  1:  For  the  purpose  of  security,  it  is 
recommended to generate a new secret key instead of 
re-using the same Ks. Thus, the master generates a 
new session key noted by K
+ to compute the HMAC 
algorithm. The master will transfer the concatenation 
of K
+ and a message M by using RSA key exchange 
which is a secure method to transfer the session key 
as in (5). With RSA key exchange, secret keys are 
exchanges  securely  by  encrypting  them  with  the 
public  key  of  the  intended  recipient.  Only  the 
recipient  can  decrypt  the  encrypted  key  because  it 
requires using  his own private key. Indeed, a third 
party who intercepts the encrypted secret key. Thus, 
secrecy  and  privacy  of  the  session  key  is  well 
obtained. Furthermore, the integrity of the encrypted 
key is accomplished since there is no way to tamper 
the transferred key. RSA algorithm is demonstrated 
to be reliable with high quality, guaranteed security 
and  strong  encryption.  The  selection  of  RSA  key 
exchange  is  also  motivated  by  its  simplicity  on 
hardware implementation. 
EKUa [K+ || M] = Cipher 3                                    (5) 
     The slave decrypts cipher 3 using the private key 
as in (6):  
 
DKRa [K
+ || M] = K
+ || M                                       (6) 
3)  Second  Authentication  Stage  (Phase  3):  This 
phase also consists of one message. 
Message  1:  The  slave  computes  the  HMAC 
algorithm to get a commitment value (CA) to be sent 
back to the master as in (7). Meanwhile the master 
computes Cm as in (7). The master device compares 
CA and Cm. If the two values match, it means that 
both the session key (K
+) and the message (M) are 
not altered. However, failure to that requires aborting 
the connection. HMAC is used as the authentication 
algorithm  because  it  can  verify  data  integrity  and 
authentication  simultaneously.  HMAC  is  employed 
with  the  hash  function  SHA256  thus  the  name 
HMAC-SHA256.  
CA = Cm = HMAC [K
+ || M]                                 (7) 
     Upon  receiving  CA,  the  Master  compares  CA  to 
Cm and decides whether authentication is successful 
or not.  
 
4) Exchange of Encrypted Data (Phase 4): This last 
phase consists of many messages depending on the 
data to share. Devices can exchange data securely by 
using a new generate secret key for encryption. The 
communication can be ended by either of the devices. 
However,  in  this  case  the  slave  will  end  the 
connection  when  it  will  finish  exchanging  data 
because  it  initiated  the  connection  for  a  specific 
purpose. It should be noted that the session key is a 
temporary key; hence for the purpose of security it 
needs  to  be  changed  periodically.  “Table 
III.”summarizes the phases of this proposal and “Fig. 
2,” represents the block diagram of the model.  Diallo Alhassane Saliou et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications   www.ijera.com 
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TABLE III.   SUMMARY STEPS OF THE PROPOSED 
MODEL 
PHASES  MESSAGES  BT 
Devices 
 
 
First 
Authentication 
Stage 
M1: IDA 
 
Slave  to 
Master 
M2:EKc[EKs(IDA)]|| 
EKUa (IV) 
 
Mater  to 
Slave 
M3:IDA|| EKs (IDA) 
 
Slave  to 
Master 
Exchange  of 
Secrete Key  
M1: EKUa [K
+ || M]  Mater  to 
Slave 
 
 
Second  
Authentication 
Stage 
M1: CA = HMAC [K
+ 
|| M]  
 
Slave  to 
Master 
Meanwhile  Master 
computes:  
Cm  =  HMAC  [K
+  || 
M] 
 
 
Master  compares CA 
to  C m  and  makes 
decision 
 
 
Exchange  of 
Encrypted 
Data 
If  authentication  is 
successful  devices 
exchange  data 
securely. 
Slave  to 
Master 
and 
Mater  to 
Slave 
 
 
Figure 2: Block diagram of the model 
 
V.  IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
Security  consideration:  For  a  correct  and  good 
implementation, the following security concerns need 
to be taken into consideration:  
  Generation of secret random keys by using a 
strong   random number generator (RNG);  
  Strength of the keys;  
  Changing the keys periodically;  
  Secure protection of keys;  
  Secure key exchange mechanism;  
  Correctness of the used algorithm. 
For  the  implementation  on  the  mentioned 
hardware and software, the following three libraries 
have been imported: AES-CBC library, RSA library 
and HMAC-SHA256 library. The Arduino board and 
the Bluetooth shield were connected together prior to 
connecting  the  board  to  a  laptop  running  Arduino 
IDE  via  a  USB  A  to  B  cable.  The  code  was 
developed on the Arduino IDE then linked to a GUI 
created in Visual studio C sharp environment.  
Designed  GUI:  The  GUI  contains  one  main  form, 
seven (7) windows for the First Authentication Stage 
(FAS1 to FAS7) and five (5) windows for the Second 
Authentication Stage (SAS1 to SAS5). 
 
Running the Source Code on Arduino IDE:  The 
source code developed on the Arduino IDE was first 
compiled and uploaded to the board. After the display 
of the message “done uploading”, the code was run 
on the serial monitor of the IDE in order to see the 
output. Upon successfully running the code source, 
the  GUI  was  debugged  to  start  the  authentication 
procedure. When the debugging was started, the main 
form  of  the  GUI  appeared.  The  main  form  is 
described as follows: 
 
Main Form of the GUI: The main form of the GUI 
named “MainForm” as shown in “Fig. 3” displays the 
following characteristics: 
 
COM  Port  or  Communication  Port:  This  label 
shows  the  port  at  which  the  Arduino  board  is 
connected. It can be port COM1, COM2, COM3, etc. 
The Arduino IDE displays the used port in the menu 
“Tools”. Thus in the GUI the user will just select the 
exact port at which the board is connected. 
 
Baud Rate: This parameter indicates the rate in baud 
(or  bits  per  second)  at  which  data  is  transferred 
between the board and the laptop via the serial port. 
The Arduino board has a serial port known as UART 
port  that  communicates  with  the  computer  via  the 
USA cable. 
 
Button Connect: After selecting the exact COM port 
and  the  speed  at  which  data  is  transferred  and 
clicking  the  button  “connect”,  the  main  form 
displays in the ride side the connected devices with 
corresponding  characteristics.  It  can  be  seen  the 
following: 
  Device: Arduino Uno Board Found 
  Serial Port: COM5 Diallo Alhassane Saliou et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications   www.ijera.com 
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  State: Connected! 
  Device: SeeedBTMaster Found 
  State: Connected! 
  MAC: 00:13:EF:12:14:7E 
In  addition  to  that,  a  small  window  named 
“Bluetooth  Connection”  is  displayed  to  show  the 
following  message  “Connection  Established  with 
the Board. Click OK to Continue”. The user needs 
to click the button “OK” to proceed to the following 
step.  
 
Button start auth: This button is used to start the 
authentication  procedure.  After  clicking  on  it,  the 
first window of the FAS appears and the label FAS1 
which  is  displayed  in  white  color  shows  that  the 
procedure  is  at  the  first  window.  Similarly  other 
labels FAS2 to SAS5 will be displayed in white color 
when the user clicks the button “Next” which is used 
to proceed to the next window.  
 
Message to send:   This  label  displays  any 
message  to  be  sent  the  board.  The  button  “Send” 
executes the actual operation. 
 
Figure 3: Main form of the GUI 
 
First  Windows  of  the  FAS  (FAS1)  Named 
Determination of Encryption Keys (Master Side): 
This window is displayed as soon as the user clicks 
the button “star auth”. It contains two labels which 
display the ID of the slave and the stored password. 
In addition to that, it has the following buttons: 
 
Button Derive Kc: This button is used to derive the 
encryption key   (Kc) from the stored password as 
shown in “Fig. 4”. Any stored password is converted 
to 128 bits ASCII for the second AES encryption. 
Button Generate Ks: This button is used to generate 
a random secret key of 16 bytes in hexadecimal (128 
bits) for the first AES encryption. 
Button Next: This button is used to proceed to the 
next  window.  By  clicking  on  it,  the  generated 
parameters  will  be  displayed  on  the  “MainForm” 
and the  following  window  will directly receive the 
necessary parameters for the actual operation. 
Button Back: This button is used to come back to 
the previous window. Here the previous window is 
the “MainForm”. 
 
Figure 4: Determination of encryption keys 
 
Second Windows of the FAS (FAS2) Named First 
AES  Encryption  (Master  Side):  After  generating 
the keys in the first window and clicking the button 
“Next”, this second window appears and displays the 
following labels and buttons as shown in “Fig. 5”: 
 
Label plaintext: This label displays the input data to 
encrypt (the slave’s ID). 
Button  Initial  Value  (IV):  This  button  is  used  to 
generate  randomly  an  IV  of  16  bytes  for the CBC 
mode encryption.  
Label  Session  Key  (Ks):  This  label  displays  the 
generated secret key for AES encryption. 
Button AES Encryption: By clicking this button the 
first AES encryption is performed. The AES library 
with CBC mode takes the three (3) inputs (plain text, 
IV and Ks) then outputs Cipher 1 of 16 bytes. 
 
Figure 5: First AES encryption master side 
 
Third Windows of the FAS (FAS3) Named Second 
AES  Encryption  (Master  Side):  By  clicking  the 
“Next”  button  in  the  previous  window,  this  third 
window  appears  and  takes  cipher  1  as  the  current 
plaintext  for  encryption.  Moreover,  the  other 
necessary parameters  which  are the IV and Kc are 
displayed as shown in “Fig. 6”. A click on the button 
“AES Encryption” produces Cipher 2 which is also Diallo Alhassane Saliou et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications   www.ijera.com 
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16 bytes. It means that the AES library takes (Cipher 
1, IV and Kc) as inputs and gives cipher 2 as output.  
 
Figure 6: Second AES encryption master side 
 
Fourth  Windows  of  the  FAS  (FAS4)  Named 
Exchange  IV:  The  objective  of  this  window  is  to 
share the IV between the Master and the Slave. To do 
that,  the  window  displays  the  IV  and  the  RSA 
parameters for encryption as shown in “Fig. 7”. The 
window shows the modus n and the public exponent 
e which are 14351 and 11 respectively. The  “RSA 
encrypt (IV)” button takes the IV, n and e as input 
and output a cipher to be sent to the slave. It should 
be  noted  that  the  imported RSA  library  provides  a 
cipher with a chain of variable “FFFFF” in length. 
The  cipher  itself  is  the  hexadecimal  values  which 
appear differently to the chain “FFFFF”. The button 
“Send encrypted (IV) and cipher 2” is used to send 
the concatenation of the encrypted (IV) and cipher 2 
to the slave. Upon clicking this button the following 
message appears in a small window “Message sent 
to the slave. Click OK to continue”.  
 
Figure 7: Exchange of initial value 
 
Fifth  Windows  of  the  FAS  (FAS5)  Named  First 
AES Decryption (Slave Side): After clicking “OK” 
in the previous small window, the actual window is 
displayed  in  the  slave  side.  The  slave  needs  to 
recover  the  received  encryptions.  To  recover  the 
encrypted IV, the modulus n and the private exponent 
d  are  displayed.  Then  the  user  clicks  the  button 
“RSA Decrypt (IV)” to get back the IV as shown in 
“Fig. 8”. Here, the RSA library takes (encrypted IV, 
n and d) as inputs and output the IV. Next, the slave 
derives  the  same  Kc  (as  done  in  the  Master  side) 
from  the  stored  password  in  the  label  “Slave 
Password”  by  just  clicking  on  the  button  “Derive 
Kc”. The label cipher 2 shows the actual cipher to be 
decrypted. Upon recovering the IV and deriving Kc 
the  button  “AES  Decryption”  is  used  to  recover 
cipher 1. Here, the AES library takes (Cipher 2, IV 
and  Kc)  as  inputs  and  recover  cipher  1.  After 
recovering  cipher  1,  the  slave  sends  back  to  the 
master the concatenation of cipher 1 and the ID. This 
concatenation  is  displayed  in  front  of  the  button 
“Slave  sends”.  By  clicking  this  button,  a  small 
window is displayed to show the following message 
“Message Sent to Master”.  
 
Figure 8: First AES decryption slave side 
 
Sixth Windows of the FAS (FAS6) Named Second 
AES  Decryption  (Master  Side):  A  click  on  the 
button “Next” of the previous window displays this 
actual window in the master side where the second 
AES  decryption  is  performed.  FAS6  displays  the 
received concatenation (slave’s ID and cipher 1), the 
IV and the secret key (Ks) as shown in “Fig. 9”. By 
clicking the button “AES Decrypt (Slave ID)”, the 
AES library takes (cipher 1, IV and Ks) to recover 
the ID of the slave. At, this point the master has the 
two IDs for verification.  
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Seventh Windows of the FAS (FAS7) Named First 
Verification (Master Side): A click on the “Next” 
button of the previous window displays the two IDs 
to be compared. Here, the button “Check” is used to 
verify  if  the  two  IDs  match.  Upon  clicking  on  it, 
either  of  the  following  messages  is  displayed  in  a 
small window: “The slave is authenticated” if the 
IDs match or “The slave is unauthenticated” if they 
are different as shown in  “Fig. 10a)”. It should be 
noted that the connection will be aborted in case of 
unsuccessful  test.  The  button  “End  of  First 
Authentication”  displays  in  a  small  window  the 
message  “End  of  First  Authentication”  which 
means that the FAS is done as shown in “Fig. 10b)”. 
By clicking the button “OK” in this small window, 
then  the  button  “Next”  the  message  “Second 
Authentication  Stage  Click  to  Begin”  appears  as 
shown in “Fig. 10c)”. After clicking “OK”, the first 
window of the SAS appears.  
 
Figure 10 a): First verification master side 
 
 
Figure 10 b): First verification master side 
 
 
Figure 10 c): First verification master side 
 
First Windows of the SAS (SAS1) Named Session 
Key Exchange (Master Side): This window allows 
the Master to generate randomly K
+ and to input a 
message M then share the concatenation of K
+ and M 
with the slave by using the RSA library. K
+ of 256 
bits is generated by clicking on the button “Generate 
K
+”.  The  label  “Message:  M”  shows  the  entered 
message M. Due to the limitation (in term of size) of 
the  RSA  library,  a  small  message  of  maximum  16 
bytes in hexadecimal can be entered. This is because 
the RSA library takes only a maximum of 48 bytes 
(384 bits) as input. It should be recalled at this point 
that M can be any length less than 512 bits because 
the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm will take care of the 
padding. The label “Plaintext = K
+ || M” shows the 
concatenation of the generated K
+ and the entered M. 
The RSA components n and e are displayed for the 
purpose of encrypting the concatenation of K
+ and M. 
The  button  “RSA  Encryption”  is  used  to  perform 
the encryption of K
+ || M and produce Cipher 3. A 
click  on  the  button  “Next”  displays  the  second 
window  of  the  SAS.  Figure  11  shows  the  first 
window of the SAS. 
 
Figure 11: Session key exchange (encryption) master 
side 
 
Second  Windows  of  the  SAS  (SAS2)  Named 
Session Key Exchange (Slave Side): This window 
displays Cipher 3 in the Slave side. The slave uses 
the RSA algorithm to decrypt Cipher 3 and get back 
K
+ || M. The required RSA components (n and d) for 
decryption are shown with their values. The modulus 
n = 14351 and the private exponent d = 1283. A click 
on the button “RSA Decryption” decrypts Cipher 3 
and  displays  K
+  ||  M.  At  the  same  time  the 
concatenation is broken and the labels “Session Key 
(K
+)”  and  “Message:  M”  display  K
+  and  M 
respectively. At this point the slave has K
+ and M for 
the  computation  of  the  HMAC-SHA256  algorithm. 
The button “Next” displays the computation of the 
HMAC-SHA256 algorithm in the following window. 
Figure 12 shows the second window of the SAS. 
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Figure 12: Session key exchange (decryption) slave 
side 
 
Third Windows of the SAS (SAS3) Named HMAC 
Algorithm  Slave  Side:  Upon  clicking  the  button 
“Next”  in  the  previous  window,  SAS3  display  K
+ 
and M separately. The button “HMAC Algorithm” 
serves  to  compute  HMAC-SHA256  algorithm  and 
output a commitment value (Ca) of 256 bits. Figure 
13 shows the third window of the SAS. 
 
Figure 13: HMAC algorithm slave side 
 
Fourth  Windows  of  the  SAS  (SAS4)  Named 
HMAC  Algorithm  Master  Side:  A  click  on  the 
button “Next” in the SAS3 window displays K
+ and 
M  in  the  SAS4  window.  The  button  “HMAC 
Algorithm”  allows  computing  HMAC-SHA256 
algorithm and outputting a commitment value (Cm) 
of 32 bytes. Figure 14 shows the fourth window of 
the SAS. 
 
Figure 14: HMAC algorithm master side 
 
Fifth Windows of the SAS (SAS5) Named Second 
Verification  Master  Side:  A  click  on  the  button 
“Next”  in  the  SAS4  window  displays  this  last 
window with Ca and Cm for comparison. The button 
“Check”  permits  the  master  to  perform  the 
verification. By clicking on it either of the following 
messages will appear in a small window: “The slave 
is  authenticated”  if  the  two  commitments  values 
match or “The slave is unauthenticated” if they are 
different. In case of unsuccessful authentication, the 
connection  will  be  aborted.  The  button  “End  of 
Second Authentication” displays in a small window 
the  message  “End  of  Second  Authentication” 
which means that the SAS is completed. By clicking 
the button “OK” in this small window, devices can 
now establish the connection and securely exchange 
encrypted  data.  Figure  15  a)  and  b)  show  these 
different operations. 
 
Figure 15 a): Second verification master side 
 
 
Figure 15 b): Second Verification Master Side 
 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The above implementation result has shown the 
workability  of  the  proposal  on  the  listed  hardware 
and software. All involved algorithms are computed 
and the result is presented a GUI. Each window is 
shown  with  different  labels  and  button  for  the 
execution of the process. The result has shown that 
the  security  issues  in  SSP  which  are  passive  and 
active  eavesdropping  are  completely  tackled  by 
preventing  the  exchange  of  public  keys  and 
passwords  in  clear  text.  Involved  secret  passwords 
and  public  keys  are  locally  stored  and  the  secret 
parameters  (IV  and  secret  keys)  are  generated 
randomly by using a strong random generator number 
then are securely exchanged with the RSA algorithm. 
Other exchanged ciphers cannot be tampered by an 
attacker due to the non-availability of the encryption 
keys to a third user and also the strength of the used 
encryption  systems.  Moreover,  strong  and  long 
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for AES encryption. Passwords are kept secret and 
refreshed  periodically.  In  addition  to  this  good 
performance  of  the  model,  this  model  is  totally 
different to both Legacy pairing and SSP in the sense 
that  it  employed  a  dual  authentication  for  more 
security. It is highly expected that this proposal will 
replace SSP for authentication. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  started  by  given  an  overview  of 
Bluetooth then discussed the weaknesses in existing 
authentication methods. Besides that, some improved 
works  have  been  reviewed  prior  to  outlining  the 
proposed  solution  for  the  current  security  issues  in 
Bluetooth  connection.  The  model  was  validated  by 
using a BT shield connected to an Arduino board and 
the obtained result was observed with conformity in a 
GUI.  The  entire  process  of  the  authentication  was 
clearly  shown  in  snipped  windows.  The  proposal 
defeats eavesdropping and MITM attacks which exist 
in  SSP  and  is  therefore  seen  to  be  the  third 
authentication method in Bluetooth. 
In addition, we address here an issue which has 
not been considered in the scheme. We believe that 
this issue is very crucial and can be mentioned as part 
of future research with this work forming the basis: 
the communication in a piconet is mostly between the 
master and slaves. However, if two slaves would like 
to communicate, their traffic must be relayed through 
the master. Therefore, it is highly important to find a 
way  for  performing  mutual  authenticating  between 
the  two  slaves.  This  issue  is  not  taken  into 
consideration in this dissertation since the database of 
the master is not shared to the slaves. Hence, a slave 
cannot authenticate another one. We hope to tackle 
this issue in the future work. 
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